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IN TIIE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

.\1 YRTL_b; FLE\VELLll\U CHRISTENSEN

'

Plaintiff and Appellaut,

vs.

HAROLD _D_;LWOUD CHRI8'l'ENSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

S'l'ATEJ\IEN'l' OF l1-iAcrrs

'l'he facts set forth by plaintiff are substantially correct, but contain gratuitous statements such as the first,
second, third, and fifth paragraphs of Page three (3)
of the Statement of Facts which contain extraneous
matter not to be found in the transcript of record on
appeal. Apparentl~', plaintiff desired to explain her position as a fact rather than as argurnl'nt. In an effort to
facilitate a proper understanding of the facts it is well
to examine them chronologically.
March 3, 1965, plaintiff signed complaint, March 4,
19G5, complaint was filed. ( Ret ord X o. 1) The complaint
prayed for an equitable settlement for the adjustment
in circumstances brought about by the marriage. March
3, 1965, the d!:'fendant signL'd a stipulatio·n. (Record
No. 9) Mareh 3, 19G5, the defendant signed an Entry
of Appearance, specifically reserving unto himself 20
days in which to plead to plaintiff's <'Omplaint. (Record
;\o. 7) Mareh l 2, 1%.), the d<>fendant exercised the
reservation contairn'd in his Appearance and filed an
Aus\n~r denying to plaintiff the right to any property

and Counterclaiming for a divon·c~ for himself. (Retorr!
No. 2)
No further pleadings, motions or }H'OCPc•dings WPn~
filed until September 30, 1965, at which time the- matter
came on regularly for trial and ·was tried. (Record No.
21) November 2, 19G5, the plaintiff filed an Affidavit
of Prejudice. N nvember 19, 1965 the Court exPcuted
its Order denying the Affidavit of Prejudice, giviug
plaintiff time in which to file a Brief. (Record No. 8)
.January -1:, 19GG, .Memorandum D(•cision. (Record No. 10)
This l\Iemorandnm directed the plaintiff to prt>pare Findings of Fact, Condusions of Law and Decree. None were
filed and the record discloses no reason sneh was not
done. So that on l\larch 10, 1966, the defendant prepared
Fndings of Fact, ·Conclusions o.f Law and Decree which
\\'ere executed by the Comt on March 11, 1966. The
plaintiff's counsel did not receive Notice of filing of
these documents upon their executio.n and as a result
she thereafter filed objections and an Order vacating
these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree;
(Record No. 15) and plaintiff's counsel submitted l1is
own Findings of Fact, Condusions of Law and Decree,
which \\'Ne executed on March 17, 19GG. (Hecord No. 18)
These likewise \\'ere submitted and executed without
notice to the defendant who was afforded on opportunity, timewise, to object.
The record discloses that both Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree as submitted by both
parties were executed without notice to either party.
The prnblerns of objections and motions came on for
argument on May 2, 19GG, as demonstrated by the Court's
Order. ( Reeord i\ o. lG)
2

'l'lte trnn:,;cript of the original procc·edings indicate

tliat tl1<' tlPfen<lnnt 1rn:-: idling to ::;tipnlafr as to his
;11r'o11l", 11ro.pPrty and lhP ·neol'1e and property of the

plaintiff. (TL 9-11) That MithPr plaintiff nor plaintiff's eotmsel oh,ird<'d to c:ueh stipulation nor did they
approve the same. In order to clarify this situation the
~kmorandum Decision of ~fay 2, 1966, directed the defendant and the plaintiff c'itlter to stipulate to the respective properties and the value thereof or that the Court
11 onld accept further tPstimony dirPcted thereto. (Record
No .2:1) 'I'hP i;laintiff refused to stipulate as to value.
On .June 24, 196() t11P Court rPopened the matter to take
te:stirnony as to the value of the property of the parties.
(Record 17, 22) At the conclusion, the Court re-executed
the Findings of Fact, Condusi.ons of Law and Decree
theretofon~ submitted by the defendant. The record
diseloses that the plaintiff was possessed o.f real property
having a valu0 of $68,500.00. (Record No. 22) That the
dc•f Pndant owm•d 41.;2 acres of land of a nominal value
with an income of $100.00 per annum. (Record No. 22)
'l'hat d(•frndant at the time of this divorce was age sixtyeig-ht and had an inconw of $200.00 per month, pension.
(Record No. 21) That plaintiff owned her own home
\\'ith n rental apartment situatt> therein. That she lost
$80.00 per month Social Secmity by rea~on of her marriage to the defendant. (Record No. 21)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONTINUING TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE ISSUES
IN SAID CAUSE AFTER THE FILING OF AN
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AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 63(b)
U.R.C.P.

The record is devoid of any 8tatements of the Court
relative to the plaintiff ex<..'.ept, "I know l\ln:;. Christensen
has a house on 25th Street. I know when she bought
it from Archie l\lclntosh, and l know when she converted
it into an apartment, so that is Yery well within the
province of the Court." (Hecord No. 21, p. 9) "'l1he
Court: "Whether voluntary or involuntary, generally
when persons marry they'rt> going to take some loss and
some gain. Now she knew she had social security at the
time she married l\Ir. Christens('n, and she knew that
when she married him she was going to lose it. I know
l\frs. Flewelling is too smart to not know that." (Record
No. 21, p. 12).
The Affidavit of Prejudice, which was subsequently
filed, indicates that the Court was prejudiced because
he was personally acquainted with the plaintiff and had
knowledge of her business transactions and past personal
life. No contention \\·as made as to how said knowledge
would prejudice the plaintiff or the defendant. Obviously,
the Court had been acquainted with the plaintiff, which
the plaintiff had to have known and had known from the
time the case was filed until after it \ms tried. Not-withstanding that, no Affidavit or Motion of Prejudice
was filed until after the trial.
The part of Rule 63 that is applicable to this is a:>
follows:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule G3 (b) "Disqualification. '\VlwneV<'l' a party to any action
4

01· prn(·c·eding or hi:,; attorney shall make and file
an affidavit that tlH~ .Judge before whom such
action or i1roceeding is to be tried or heard has
a bias o.r prejudice, either against such partv or
his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to
the suit, such judge shall proceed to further therein, except to call in another judge to hear and
determine the matter.

The meaning of this paragraph is clear, unequivocal
and in no· way ambiguous. The pertinent part of the
paragraph is "to be tried or heard." This clearly implies
future proceedings. Anderson L Anderson, 13 Utah 236;
3G8 P2d 264, is a case where a Petition was brought by
the divorced husband for an Order to Show Cause why
the award of custody to the divorced wife should not
be vacated and why support money should not be terminated. Prior to the time of taking evidence on said petition
the defendant filed an Affidvait of Bias and Prejudice
against the Court who was to sit, and did sit, on the
case. Prior to taking the evidence the trial Court denied
removal of the cause to another Judge.
The Supreme Court held that was in error.
However, the plaintiff cites no case wherein after
a proceedings has started and evidence has been taken
that the rule applies. The reason for this is obvious.
Any competent trial lawyer would proceed to trial armed
with an Affidavit of Prejudice and at any time during
the proceedings, if he felt the Court was leaning toward
the other side or he did not like the rulings of the Court
on tlw admission of evidence he could immediately file
tlw Affidavit of Prejudice, terminate the proceedings and
start all over with another Judge.
5

This could continue ad infinitum until plaintiff's
counsel felt that he was obtaining rulings favorable for
his clinent, assuming that of course opposing counsel
at that time did not file a similar Affidavit of Prejudice
on behalf of his client. If plaintiff's position is to be
sustained, then obviously no trial would proceed without
the filing of an Affidavit of Prejudice and litigation
would continue interminably.
The clear intent of the rule, as it explicitly provides,
is to afford either part~- an opportunity to disqualify a
judge at any time prior to the taking of evidence. It
does not purport and cannot be so interpreted to purport
permission for either party to interrupt and terminate
a trial that has been presented or partially presented
theretofore by the mere filing of an Affidavit of Bias
and Prejudice.
It is submitted that the trial court had no alternative but to rule that the filing of the Affidavit of Bias
and Prejudice was in fact untimely and to deny the same.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO FOLLOW THE ALLEGED STIPULATION OF PARTIES,

(a) Because the same waived alimony.
(b) Because plaintiff did not challenge the Stipulation.

( c) Because defendant did not claim that the same

was obtained uy fraud, duress or misrepresentation.

(a) Because the same waived alinwny,

(b) Because plaintiff di.d nut challenge the Stipu-

lation
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'l'lw two points set forth above will be considered
jointly by the ddendant.

'1 lw defendant did in fact upon the day o.f execution
of the eomplaint PXPcute a stipulation. At the same time
hA executed an Entry of Appearance reserving unto himsr·lf 20 days to contest the matter. He subsequently did
r·ontest all of the application of the plaintiff in hi::;:
Answer and additionally executed his Counterclaim
against the plaintiff asking that a divorce be granted
unto himself. At the time of trial the defendant cont'eded that prior to the time he had employed counsel
and prior to the time he decided what he was going
to do he had executed the stipulation. (Record 21, pp. 2, 3)
'l'he only real issue at the time of trial was the question
of the property. (Record 21 pp. 2, 3) The plaintiff
was well aware of the situation but argued that having
executed the stipulation without benefit of counsel he
has no· right at any time to contest this matter. The
difficulty with this position is that it is contrary to
law. The rule is well stated in 27B Corpus Juris Secondum, page 409."
1

"Property settlement agreements are binding
when approved by the court and embodied or
merged in the decree entered by the court in a
divorce proceeding unless it appears that the decree was ]Jrocured through fraud."
Further, at Page 411:
"it has heen asserted generally that property
settlement agreements must be approved hy the
Court and embodied in the Decree in order to give
them validity and efficacy, that it is the court's
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decree which gives :mch settlement it::; validity."

" '* "" * While it i::; true that hushand and wife
cannot lawfully enter into an agreement for divorce, yet it is well settled that the amount of
alimony which the husband is to pay to the wife,
the terms of the payment and the length of time
during which such payment is to continue, may
be all arranged between them by consent, subje;l
to the ratification of the court.' " (Emphasis suvplied.)
In the same case, North v. North the court held
that it was the duty of the court to examine the
agreement and further held that it was the duty
of the court to approve the agreement if it found
the contract was free from fraud, collusion, or
compulsion and was fair to the wife. Thus we
find that the mere entering into the contract
between the parties and the filing of the contract
in the cause do not make it a part of the judgment
o.f the court until the court examines the entire
contract and ratifies or approves it, either by a
minute on the trial docket of the Judge or by
making some other appropriate order or direc·
tion. In addition to what has been said in the
North case about the need for approval or ratification of the agreement, we have a pro,vision in
the "Stipulation" in the instant case that specifically calls for approval by the trial court.
Therefore, from what has been pointed out
regarding the need for approval of the "Stipulation" by the trial court, the only question before
this court is whether there is sufficient evidence
of judicial action by the trial court in connection
with the hearing of plaintiff's petition for divorce
in May, 1948 showing that the Court approved
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all of tlw terms of the "Stipulation.''
A similar conelusion waH stated in the Virginia case
lli9gi11s v. McFarland, 86 S.K 2d lGS; 196 Ya. 889,
A decree for alimony is not founded on contract,
but on the natural and legal duty of the husband
to support the wife. No agreement of the parties
has any effect on the decree awarding alimony
unless it is ratified and made effective by judicial
sanction. Capell v. Capell, 164 Va. 45, 178 S.E.
894; Branch v. Branch, 144 Va. 244, 132 S.E. 303;
Henebry v. Henebry, supra. Judgments and decrees are contracts of the highest order and especially is this so when entered by consent of the
parties. Roberts' Arunr. v. Cocke, etc. 28 Grat.
207, 69 Ya. 207; Hounshell v. Hounshell, 116 Va.
675, 82 S.E. 689.
St>e also, Arizona, Wright 1:. Stidman, 390 P2d 107;
Georgia, Kaiser vs. Kaiser, H± S.E. 2d 397; Wisconsin,
Bergevin v. Bergevin, 170 N.W. 820; California, Anthony
v. Anthonu, 211 P2d 331.
The Supreme Court of Utah has not specifically
ruled on this question, however, it would appear that
there can be no doubt that it would follow this rule.
The very cases cited by the plaintiff as authority for
its position clearly state that a trial court is not bound
by any stipulation. That such stipulation, while not to
be considered lightly, is advisory only and that the
Court, in the exercise of its sole discretion, may adopt
or reject a stipulation. Thus in Madsen v. J.lfodsen, 276
P.2d 917; 2 Utah 2d ±23, the Court had before it an
appeal by a wife where the trial court had not abided by
the proposed stipulation. 'l'he Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court, stated:
9

ln so assuming tihe erred, tiince tltl' trial comt
in divo.rce matters, where the state is an inter~
ested party, nc'e>d not ahick, necessarily, with the
terms of the litigants' stipulations, although such
stipulations should be respected and great weight
given thereto. Plaintiff's only complaint in thi~
respect, would hl•, not that the~ c·ourt was dutv
bound and erroneously refused to carry out th~
terms agreed upon, but that it abused its discretion by entering an inequitable decn~e, a matter
we must determine on review. Unless there is a
clear abuse of discretion, we cannot disturb the
trial court on such matters.
This is precisely contrary to the statement of the plaintiff that the comi has not ruled upon the power of the
Court to alter a stipulation unless it be shown that there
be fraud, duress, or misrepresenation. An examination
of Madsen v. Madsen dot>s not indicate any place that
these allegations were present in the case or that an
issue was framed thereon.
Similarly, Mathie v. Mathie, 363 P.2d 779; 12 Utah 2d
116, was a case where the wife appealed from a Decree
of Divorce insofar as it disclosed the property. The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court with some modifications that it deemed necessary for the purpose of
clarification, saying, in part:
It is apparent that the trial court, ht>ing convinced
that the parties had come to a necessary parting
of the ways, and that grounds for divoree \Vere
established, proceeded to consider the various
factors proper to take into. account and in the
li ()'ht thereof made such adjustment of their prope;ty rights as he thought would provide the best
foundation for each to liw separately. Having
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dorn• so, it is our duty to give deference to his

a~lvantaged position and prerogatives, and not to

disturb the decree unless it is sh0\n1 clearly and
1wrsuasively to be so unfair and inequitable as
to manifest an abuse of the wide discretion reposed in the trial court in such matters.
'1 he parties canno,t by contract completely defeat
the authority expressly conferred upon the Court
by our statute, Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, in cases
o.f divorce to "make such orders in relation to
* '' * property * * * as may be equitable." Under
it there can be no doubt of the court's prerogative
to make \Yhatever disposition of the property,
including the rights in such a contract, as it deems
fair, equitable and necessary for the protection
and welfare of the parties. There is no basis for
C'oncluding that the decree entered in the instant
case is so manifestly inequitable or unjust that
we should upset it.
1

'l'he l\fathiti case was a case identical to the case
at Bar to the extent that in the Mathie case no alimony
or support was asked or awarded. This is precisely the
same factor that plaintiff relies on to take it out of
the decisions of Utah. The very cases cited by plaintiff
are actually authority for the proposition that the fact
that a stipulation does not contain provisions for alimony
or snpport money are not binding upon the Court in the
ahsenee of fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation.
Again the court in the Mathie case does not cite the
prnbk•m of fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation,
nor did it find it necessary to find these elements before
n <·mut could deviate from the terms of the stipulation.
'I'lw n·maining cases cited by the plaintiff, to-wit: CaUister 1-. Callister, 261 P.2d 944; Barraclough v. Barra-
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clough, 11 P.2d 792 - 100 U. 196; Hall v. Hall, 177 P.2d
731 - 111 U. 263; and Jones v. Jones, 139 P.2d 222 104 U. 275, do not support plaintiff's position. Hall v.
Hall was a case invo·lving contempt proceedings. While
it discussed the power of the Court to adopt or reject
a stipulation, an examination of the facts indicate that
the evidence discloses that he had been out of work,
remarried, had attempted to borrow money from the
bank to keep the payments current and that he had
done all he could do and had done all that his wife had
requested him to do. The Court found that the adjudication of contempt was not well founded. The other three
cases, Jones 1-'. Jones, Barraclough v. Barraclough, and
Callister v. Callister were concerned with the power of
the Court to modify a decree of divorce where such
decree either incorporated therein or approved a stipulation theretofore entered. In each of these cases the
Court recognizes the authority inherent in the trial court
to subsequently modify a decree, notwithstanding the
fact that it was entered into with the accordance of
stipulation by the parties.
Thus in Barracloiigh v. Barraclough, 11 P.2d 792,
100 U. 196, the Court stated:
Therefore, the trial court erred in determining
that the agreement here constituted a "complete
and final settlement of all alimony between the
parties, and that such settlement has become a
final judgment as to alimony * * * insofar as
a petition to modify is concerned.'' In a divorce
action the trial court should make such provision
for alimony as the present circumstances of the
parties \Varrant, and any stipulation of the partie:s
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in n•speet thereto serves only as a recommendation to the court. If the court adopts the sngµ;(•sti(m of the parties it does not thereby lose
the right to make such modification or dhange
tlwn~after as nmy be requested by either party
lrnsed on some change in circumstances warranting such modification. And where an appeal is
taken from the judgment of the trial court in such
case we will review the record to determine
whether or not the applicant is entitled to the
relief sought in the petition to modify the alimo.ny
decree. Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 47
P.2d 419; Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12
P.2d 364.

In Jones v. Junes, 139 P. 2d 222, 104 U. 27G, the Court
cited the Barraclough case with approval.
In CaUister v. Callister 261 P.2d 944, the Court
stated:
... an agreement or stipulation between parties
to a divorce suit as to alimony or payments for
suppo·rt of children is not binding upon the court
in entering a divorce decree, but serves only as
a reconm1endation, and if the court adopts the
suggestion of the parties it does not thereby lose
the right to make such modification or change
thereafter as may be requested by either party,
based upon change of circumstances warranting
such modification. Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275,
129 P.2d 222; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100
Utah 19G, 111 P.2d 792.

Jn said decision the Court disenssed the decisions that

hold that a Court has no power after judgment to modify
a d<>crt'P, based n1ion an agreed property settlement, and
JH'kl:
But insofar as the decision might be considered
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authority for th(~ doctrine that the court ha:::; no
jurisdiction to modify an award of alimony in
a case where tl1ere ha:::; been a property :settlement,
we are not inclined to follow it.

It is obvious tlwreforP that rule in Utah requires (1)
an agrel'd stipulation by tlw parties, and ( 2) that even
though an agreed stipulation i:::; submitted by the parties
to the Court that it is advi.sory only and that the trial
court need not adopt tht• :same, and that this power
to deviate includes the power to modify the :::;arne,
whether the same incoq)orate:::; the stipulation or not.

In this case the defendant eleetPd to contest the provisions of the stipulation. He further elected to dispute
her right to any property acquired by the defendant prior
to the nwrriage. Further, the trial court found that it
would be unequitable and unjust to award her substantially all of the property owned by the defendant after
only one year of ma1 riage. Even so the court did in
fact award her approximately one-third of the assets
that he had prior to entering into the marital agreement.
This i:::; in accord ·with the rule that has long been recognized in Utah on an award of one-third of the husband's
property to the ·wife. Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55
PS-!; Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah 444, 16G P.2d 51G;
Bullen v. B11llcn, 71 Uah 63, 262 P. 292.
The decision of the trial court was entirely within
the scope of cases previously approved by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah. The plaintiff does not
contend that then' ·was an abuse of discretion per se.
She merdy says that the amount of money allocatPd 1rns
insufficient and that the court did not cooperate and

14

;l1J1i~;(•<l it;-; dis<·rdion h~- following the rnle:s sd down hy
tit<• t-ltate of (!tali.

did llOf doim !hut !he 8tip1tlatio11
/( u.; nl1i<:;,;erl /;y Fnmd, Duress, or Misrcpre-

l'·) /:1 <tlfs(' lie

s1· 11 tut /011 .

.\s l1a~ lwrdofon· lw<:•11 set•n the trial courts in Utah
<1o lwv<' th<• right to disregard a stipulation and in fact
liaw tlH: power to modify a Decree which adopted or
<l] 1proved the same. The only cases tliat the Court cites
arl' hrn California decisions, Ale:rander v. Alexander,
l~J9 P.2d 3-tS, and Hallmccl! L Hallowell, 179 P.2d 22.
Both of these cas< ~; are Cali l'urnia decision::;. '11 hey hold
that a Court <:annot modify v. decree o.f divorce wherein
tht• 1kcreP adopts a stipulation voluntarily entered by the
parti(•s as has been previously seen. The Utah Court
ha~; considered this precise argument in Barraclough r.
Burraclou.!Jh and chose specifically not to adopt the same.
EvPn this rule is not as rigid as counsel would have
tlw Court believe. Thus in Morgan v. Ill organ, 234 P.2d
782, tlw Court had before it the problem of one party
<1t:•manding that the prior property settlement be enfo1e<•d upon their spouse ·who claimed that the agreement
had been in fact cancelled and terminated. The trial
<'onrt agr<'<>d with the latter contention and upon appeal
:oo d!d the Court of appeals say:
\Vhether, in such a case, the agre<:.•ment does or
does not continue in force, depends upon the
mutual intentio.ns and understanding of the partiPs. It is to be detennined by the court as a
qne::;tion or fact, and upon indirect evidence in
tlw 2 l):oeneL' of di rec·t eviclene<'. As said in Estate
of Boeson, :201 Cal. 3G, 42, 255 P. SOO, 802: ''Prop
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erty settlements entered into by the spousPs, it i:.:
true, should be set aside in cases where the act 8,
conduct and relations of the parti<>s tliereaftl•r an·
of such a character as to justify the conclusion
that they intended and agreed orally to abrngatt:
the same (citing cases)." It has fn•quently bt'en
held, at least as to executory pl'Ovisions of a
property settlement agreement, that cancellation
will be inf erred and former rights will he rc·stored by reconciliation and resumption of marital relation. Mundt v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins_
Co., 35 Cal, App. 2d JlG, 95 P.2d 966; Wells v.
Stout, 9 Cal. 479; Sargent v. Sargent, 106 Cal.
5+1, 39 P. 931; Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Ind. Ace
Comm., Gl Cal. App. 2d. 275, 142 P.2d 754; Gregg
v. Manufacturers Bldg. Corp., 134 Cal. App. 147,
25 P.2d 1014. See also, 30 C.J. 1065, 106G, 4~
C.J.S., Husband and ·wife, 601; Nelson on Divorce, Y ol. 1, p, 495, sec. 13.14.
Each case is to be decided on its own facts
It is unnecessary to distinguish the cases relied
upon by appellant which had only that the evi
dence was sufficient to support findings contrary
to the claim that the several property settlement
agreements were abrogated by subsequent oral
agreements.
The gist of this argument by the plaintiff is that she now
requests the Supreme Court to set forth and adopt the
California minority view, which it has heretofore rejected.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION.

The plaintiff states that as a rule of law the Supreme
Court has a right to modify under proper circumstance~
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thP <kcision of a trial court in a divorce action, and that
;is a conSl'(lllf'm·c the Supreme Court should in this case
modify th<' trial Court's decision. 1 he plaintiff does not
~ay wh~· it should be modified, how and in what manner
1lw Court abused its discretion, how and why the decision
(;L th<' trial court is inequitable other than the fact that
she does not like the decision.
1

As the records previously set out indicate the parties
had been married approximately one year; that at the
time of th0i r marriage the plaintiff had properties of a
value of $68,500.00, hau a home with a rental apartment
therein. That the defendant, a man of 68 years of age,
unemployed with a $200.00 a month pension, a $5,000.00
savings account and an unimproved piece of ground
from which he receives the sum of $100.00 per year. All
of thP property had been acquired by both the plaintiff
and the defendant prior to the time of their marriage.
The Court awarded plaintiff $1500.00 of the $5,000.00
savings acquired by the defendant.
The plaintiff dot's not say how or in what manner
this is unjust or inequitable, and cites no authority that
it is. Counsel's only argument is that defendant should
he bound by a repudiated stipulation and that the court,
contrary to law, should also be bound by such repudiated
stipulation and as a consequence the trial court so clearly
abus0d its discretion that it committed error. No authorities were cited in support of this other than the repudiatt•d California decisions. It is submitted on the
fads and on the law that no abuse of the law was in fact
rnnd<' and tlwre is no rPason for this court not to affirm
HtP

trial court's findings.
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POINT IV
REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE
PLAINTIFF'S PROFFERS OF PROOF.

Refusal of the Court to admit the proffered evidence
is again without foundation in fact and in law. The plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to present evidence as
to her need, value of her property, as well as the value
of the property of the defendant; she made no effort
to do so. Instead she chose to ignore her relative wealth
and the relative poverty of the defendant and complained
of her lost Social Security benefits. Having waived the
right to introduce actuarial evidence when it should have
been presented, she chose to attempt to expand the order
of the trial court for her own purposes. Now, having
failed to avail herself of even that extension complains
because it was not extended further. Having waived
her opportunities she now complains that the trial court
erred because it did not grant further opportunities.
It is respectfully suggested that no authorities have
been submitted, because none existed, which support this
view that prejudicial error was committed.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the appeal of the

plaintiff should be dismissed and that the defendant
should be awarded his costs herein.
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